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Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is a type of conditional reasoning that enables the
generation of mental simulations of alternatives to past factual events. Previous research
has found this cognitive feature to be disrupted in schizophrenia (Hooker et al., 2000;
Contreras et al., 2016). At the same time, the study of cognitive deficits in unaffected
relatives of people with schizophrenia has significantly increased, supporting its potential
endophenotypic role in this disorder. Using an exploratory approach, the current study
examined CFT for the first time in a sample of non-psychotic first-degree relatives of
schizophrenia patients (N = 43), in comparison with schizophrenia patients (N = 54)
and healthy controls (N = 44). A series of tests that assessed the “causal order
effect” in CFT and the ability to generate counterfactual thoughts and counterfactually
derive inferences using the Counterfactual Inference Test was completed. Associations
with variables of basic and social cognition, levels of schizotypy and psychotic-like
experiences in addition to clinical and socio-demographic characteristics were also
explored. Findings showed that first-degree relatives generated a lower number of
counterfactual thoughts than controls, and were more adept at counterfactually deriving
inferences, specifically in the scenarios related to regret and to judgments of avoidance
in an unusual situation. No other significant results were found. These preliminary
findings suggest that non-psychotic first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients show
a subtle disruption of global counterfactual thinking compared with what is normally
expected in the general population. Due to the potential impact of such deficits, new
treatments targeting CFT improvement might be considered in future management
strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) is a specific type of conditional
reasoning related to mental simulations of past events generally
triggered to a great extent by negative outcomes. In other words,
and to quote Van Hoeck et al. (2015, p. 1), CFT refers to the
“remarkable ability to infer how an event might have unfolded
differently, without directly experiencing this alternative reality.”
In this way, most people compare the actual result of the event
with “what might have been” by generating different hypothetical
outcomes “if only” an alternative event had taken place (Byrne,
2016). For instance, in the fictional scenario where John has
failed an important test, he could automatically generate a
counterfactual thought like, If I had studied more, I could have
passed the test.
Concerning CFT’s neuroanatomical correlates, fMRI studies
suggest that prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions are the primary
regions activated in people engaged in counterfactual reasoning
tasks, although other regions have been found to be related
such as the temporal lobes, the left temporal gyrus, and the
left cerebellum (Barbey et al., 2009; Van Hoeck et al., 2012).
Counterfactual reasoning supports adaptive behavior by enabling
us to learn from past experiences (Epstude and Roese, 2008)
and by modulating emotional state (Roese and Olson, 1997),
promoting creativity (Markman et al., 2007), and supporting
future planning and prediction (Smallman and Roese, 2009), in
addition to playing a behavior-regulating function that influences
behavioral changes and performance improvement (Epstude and
Roese, 2008). Furthermore, CFT seems to be related to specific
cognitive biases such as the hindsight bias—enhancing memory
distortions that contribute to suboptimal decision-making (Roese
and Olson, 1996) and to Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits involved
in the development of false belief (Byrne, 2016).
Studies of subtle cognitive alterations in unaffected relatives
of schizophrenia patients have significantly increased over
the last decade in an effort to confirm the hypothesis that
these deficiencies might be potential endophenotypes for this
disorder (Gottesman and Gould, 2003; Sitskoorn et al., 2004).
Contributing to the etiology of schizophrenia (Cardno et al.,
1999; Cannon et al., 2000; Byrne et al., 2003), these deficits
seem to meet the fifth criterion for endophenotype validation in
psychiatry since they are found to a lesser degree in the unaffected
relatives of people with this disorder (Gottesman and Gould,
2003). Such deficiencies include alterations in declarative and
working memory, sustained attention, verbal fluency, perceptual-
motor speed, and certain executive functions (Sitskoorn et al.,
2004; Szöke et al., 2005; Snitz et al., 2006). In addition, cognitive
biases related to particular symptoms of schizophrenia, such as
the data gathering bias known as “jumping to conclusions,” have
also been described among non-psychotic relatives of patients
with schizophrenia (Van Dael et al., 2006; Broome et al., 2007).
Regarding social cognition, the data remain inconsistent (Green
et al., 2008). Some studies have found evidence of alterations
in these probands compared with normal controls (Janssen
et al., 2003; Bediou et al., 2007; Lavoie et al., 2013; Cella et al.,
2015), whereas other studies have shown no differences at all
(Kelemen et al., 2004; Loughland, 2004). Similar deficits have
also been observed both in unaffected first-degree relatives high
in schizotypy (Chen et al., 1998; Laurent et al., 2000; Vollema
and Postma, 2002) and in healthy individuals that have reported
psychotic-like experiences (PLEs; Kelleher and Cannon, 2011).
Currently, there is general agreement that neurocognition
is a key feature of schizophrenia with deficits in all cognitive
domains (Heinrichs and Zakzanis, 1998). Such deficits have
already been recorded in the early stages of the disorder (Censits
et al., 1997; Keefe et al., 2006; Crespo-Facorro et al., 2011).
Thus, given that schizophrenia seems to be related, at least in
part, to a PFC dysfunction (Goldman-Rakic, 2011; Jackowski
et al., 2012), and that this neurocognitive impairment seems
to be the single strongest correlate of these patients’ real-
world functioning (Green, 1996; Fett et al., 2011), it is not
surprising that studies exploring counterfactual reasoning in
these patients have emerged over recent years (Hooker et al.,
2000; Contreras et al., 2016). Accordingly, the results of such
research have revealed disruption in these patients’ abilities to
generate counterfactual thoughts, to attribute causality through
CFT, as well as to counterfactually derive inferences in the face of
different fictional social scenarios. The further study of these CFT
disruptions in the schizophrenia spectrum has been encouraged
since it might help in the understanding of these patients’ day-
to-day challenges, or eventually provide a new diagnostic tool
or even a new target for treatment (Van Hoeck et al., 2015).
In keeping with this goal, one possible approach might be
through the identification of these cognitive endophenotypes
among individuals who have no clinical needs but are at risk for
psychosis, such as unaffected first-degree relatives of people with
schizophrenia. Research on this topic has become an important
area of investigation in recent years not only for providing critical
information about the pathophysiology of the disorder but also
for its potential to direct early interventions and prevention
programs among both schizophrenia patients and these at-risk
individuals.
Using an exploratory approach, the current study reports the
assessment of CFT in a sample of non-psychotic first-degree
relatives of people with schizophrenia. To our knowledge, this
is the first time that counterfactual reasoning has been explored
among this group and compared to schizophrenia patients
and healthy controls. CFT was quantitatively evaluated using
different methods of assessment including (1) the generation of
counterfactual thoughts, (2) the “causal order effect” on CFT
(Wells et al., 1987), and (3) the ability to make counterfactual-
derived inferences, assessed using the Counterfactual Inference
Test (CIT; Hooker et al., 2000). Potential associations with
measures of neurocognition and social cognition, level of
schizotypy and PLEs, as well as with any particular socio-
demographic characteristic, were further assessed.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 141 participants—54 patients with schizophrenia, 43
non-psychotic first-degree relatives, and 44 healthy controls—
all fluent in Spanish and between 19 and 66 years of age, were
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included in the study after an initial inclusion interview in
which an informed consent form was signed and mental and
personality disorders were assessed using the structured clinical
interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First et al.,
1997) and Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II; First et al.,
1994). The sample was recruited from the outpatient services
of the Psychiatry Department of Bellvitge University Hospital,
the Polyvalent Mental Health Unit (Benito Menni CASM), and
the Mental Health Unit of L’Hospitalet de Llobregat (Catalan
Institute of Health). Potential participants were excluded if they
had a history of head trauma involving loss of consciousness,
an organic disease with mental repercussions, or an estimated
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) below 70. All study procedures were
approved by the Clinical Research Ethics Committee of the Ciutat
Sanitària de Bellvitge (CEIC Bellvitge).
First-degree relatives—19 parents, 19 siblings, and 5
offspring—of schizophrenia patients of the three collaborating
units were also sampled. Family members were excluded
if they had a history of a psychotic disorder or substance
abuse. All schizophrenia patients met DSM-IV-TR criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), were in remission
as defined by Andreasen et al. (2005), and had not undergone
electroconvulsive therapy in the last 6 months. Participants
with other Axis I disorders were excluded. Healthy control
participants were recruited from hospital employees; exclusion
criteria were a previous history of personal (Axis I and Axis II)
or family psychiatric illness or substance use disorder.
Measures and Procedures
Socio-demographic and Clinical Measures
Socio-demographic data were collected for all participants,
including gender, age, years of education, current occupation,
and civil status. Laterality was assessed by means of the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Estimated IQ
was calculated using a combined score from the Vocabulary and
Block Design subtests from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
battery III (Sattler, 2001; Wechsler, 2001).
Symptoms and severity of illness were assessed using the
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987;
Peralta and Cuesta, 1994), the Montgomery–Asberg Depression
Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery and Asberg, 1979; Lobo
et al., 2002), the Clinical Global Impression-Severity Scale
(CGI-S; Guy, 1976), and the Scale to Assess Unawareness of
Mental Disorder (SUMD; Amador and Strauss, 1990; Ruiz
et al., 2008). Level of functioning was assessed with the Global
Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). Pharmacological treatment was recorded,
and antipsychotic daily dose equivalents of chlorpromazine were
calculated (Kane et al., 2003).
Counterfactual Thinking Evaluation
Counterfactual thinking was examined using a set of three
different measures in the following order: (1) the “causal order
effect,” (2) the generation of counterfactual thoughts, and (3) the
ability to counterfactually derive inferences.
To begin with, two experiments framed on the research
paradigm originally designed by Wells et al. (1987) were carried
out to examine the first two measures. For further information
about this procedure, the reader is referred to the work of these
aforementioned authors, but, in brief, the procedure consisted
of reading aloud to the probands a fictional scenario of four
consecutive independent events that resulted in a negative
outcome. In order to avoid the first event bias, the researcher
randomly changed the order of the events using a 4 × 4 Latin
square design. Thus, the scenario provided the frame for the two
experiments described below.
Experiment 1: The causal order effect
In this experiment, participants were asked to choose which one
of the four events was the most probable cause of the negative
outcome of the scenario—in other words, the event they would
select in order to undo the final result. This procedure was
based on previous research that has described how the general
population usually chooses the first of a chain of events as the
main determinant event, even though these events are equal
and objectively none is more crucial than the others for the
final negative outcome (Segura et al., 2002). Thus, this effect
explains how the focus of CFT tends to be influenced by the
order in which the information is presented. To complete this
experiment, participants had to choose a specific event from the
sequence. Those who, even when encouraged, were still unable
to choose one of the events, were directly assigned the response
type “reasoning blocking.” This was done to ensure that these
responses were not considered as missing data. The time given
to participants to complete this experiment was 60 s. Researchers
recorded each participant’s answer.
Experiment 2: Generation of counterfactual thoughts
The ability to spontaneously generate counterfactual thoughts for
the purpose of avoiding the final negative outcome was assessed
by asking the participants to say aloud as many alternatives
as possible. These counterfactual thoughts could be original
alternatives (e.g., “If only I had called and made a reservation in
advance”) or alternatives that changed one of the “unfortunate”
events (e.g., “If only I hadn’t been speeding”). All discrete
responses given were recorded by two independent researchers,
who filtered which answers were real counterfactual thoughts and
which ones were illogical or bizarre (e.g., “I continued sleeping”).
Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT)
Originally developed by Hooker et al. (2000), the CIT was
administered to measure ability to generate counterfactually
derived inferences. This is a multiple-choice, self-reporting
instrument designed to evaluate the influence of different
specific characteristics of a situation when individuals generate
counterfactual inferences. The CIT is based on previous research
that described how CFT is enhanced when encountering events
with outcomes preceded by unusual rather than typical actions
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), or events that seem “almost” to
have occurred—either spatially or temporally (Kahneman and
Varey, 1990). CFT can also influence an individual’s affective
and judgmental reaction to these situations by enhancing or
diminishing these reactions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982;
Kahneman and Varey, 1990).
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Thus, the CIT presents four scenarios in which two events
with similar outcomes are experienced by two different subjects.
However, the circumstances between the events differ such that
one of the subjects should think “if only” to a greater extent
than the other. For each situation, three possible answers are
presented: a target counterfactual response (the option where
CFT is activated to a greater extent), a non-target response (the
option where CFT is also activated but less intensely), and a
“same/can’t tell” answer if the participant considers none of
the previous options to be suitable (the option where CFT is
not activated at all; see Table 1). Each scenario in the test is
given a maximum score of 1 if the subject chooses the target
counterfactual response; if the subject chooses any of the other
answers, the score given is zero. The total score, therefore,
may range between 0 and 4, with greater values indicating a
counterfactual response closer to a normative pattern.
Neuropsychological Evaluation
Cognitive function was assessed using a comprehensive battery of
13 standardized neuropsychological tests, designed to encompass
all cognitive dimensions proposed in the MATRICS battery
(Green et al., 2004). The tests are summarized in Table 2.
Evaluation of Schizotypy and Psychotic-like
Experiences
Levels of schizotypy and PLEs were assessed among relatives
and controls using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-
Brief (SPQ-B; Raine and Benishay, 1995; Spanish adaptation
by Mata et al., 2005) and the Community Assessment of
Psychotic Experiences-42 (CAPE-42; Stefanis et al., 2002; Spanish
adaptation by Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2012), respectively.
TABLE 1 | The Counterfactual Inference Test (Hooker et al., 2000).
Scenario Response
(1) Reaction of upset (affective) in response to a spatial
“nearly happened” event
Janet is attacked by a mugger only 10 m from her house.
Susan is attacked by a mugger 1 km from her house. Who
is more upset by the mugging?
(a) Janet
(b) Susan
(c) Same/Can’t tell
(2) Reaction of regret (affective) in response to an “unusual”
event
Anna gets sick after eating at a restaurant she often visits.
Sarah gets sick after eating at a restaurant she has never
visited before. Who regrets their choice of restaurant more?
(a) Anna
(b) Sarah
(c) Same/Can’t tell
(3) Reaction of rumination (judgmental) in response to a
temporal “nearly happened” event
Jack misses his train by 5 min. Ed misses his train by more
than an hour. Who spends more time thinking about the
missed train?
(a) Ed
(b) Jack
(c) Same/Can’t tell
(4) Reaction of avoidance (judgmental) in response to an
“unusual” event
John gets into a car accident while driving on his usual way
home. Bob gets into a car accident while trying a new way
home. Who thinks more about how his accident could have
been avoided?
(a) Bob
(b) John
(c) Same/Can’t tell
Typical pattern of responses—that is, the target counterfactual responses—are
indicated in boldface (Hooker et al., 2000).
Statistical Analysis
For the descriptive analyses, absolute and relative frequencies
were calculated for categorical variables. Continuous variables
were assessed using the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD)
for normally distributed variables, and the median and range
for non-normally distributed variables. To detect differences
between groups, Fisher’s exact test and χ2 were used for
categorical data, whereas group means were compared using
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) followed by a Tukey
test for post hoc analyses. The Kruskal–Wallis test was used
for non-normally distributed data. Multivariate linear regression
analyses were done to assess significant differences between
groups for all CFT measures, adjusted for age, gender, and
estimated IQ, as well as to explore potential associations
between these measures and variables of neurocognition and
social cognition, schizotypy, PLEs, and socio-demographic and
clinical characteristics. A value of p < 0.05 was considered
statistically significant. All analyses were conducted using
R 3.1.3.
RESULTS
Socio-demographic and Clinical
Characteristics
Socio-demographic characteristics are summarized in Table 3.
The results of the analyses revealed the group of relatives
to be older than the rest of the sample, and the group of
patients to have a higher proportion of single and retired
individuals, and a lower proportion of women and a lower
estimated IQ. Regarding clinical characteristics, the patients
exhibited mild levels of symptom severity on the PANSS total
score (M = 65.26, SD = 7.80), on the MADRS (M = 11.65,
SD = 6.24), on the SUMD (M = 5.20, SD = 2.68), and
on the CGI-SCH (M = 3.30, SD = 0.50). The median GAF
score was 70 (range = 50–80); the average length of illness
was 16.32 years (SD = 10.42); and the mean daily dose of
antipsychotic treatment taken was 650.94 mg/day (SD = 468.75;
chlorpromazine equivalents).
Counterfactual Thinking Evaluation
Experiment 1: The Causal Order Effect
No statistically significant differences were found for this
experiment in the general pattern of responses between the
first-degree relatives, the schizophrenia patients and the healthy
subjects (χ2 = 3.19, p = 0.922; Table 4). In addition, the
proportion of participants unable to choose any of the four events
(that is, the “reasoning blocking” response) was similar between
groups (χ2 = 0.40, p = 0.820). Nonetheless, the results showed
a tendency among the healthy controls to choose the first event
more frequently than the other groups (29.5% versus 27.9% of
the relatives and 24.1% of the patients).
Experiment 2: Generation of Counterfactual Thoughts
Figure 1 presents the results of this experiment. Post hoc analysis
revealed that first-degree relatives generated a significantly lower
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TABLE 2 | Neuropsychological Test Battery.
Cognitive domain Test
Laterality Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971)
Estimated IQ Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, Vocabulary Test (Wechsler, 2001)
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, Block Design Test (Wechsler, 2001)
Attention Continuous Performance Test-II; CPT (Conners, 2000)
Processing speed Trail Making Test – Form A (Reitan, 1958)
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, Symbol Coding Test (Wechsler, 2001)
Stroop Test, word-color (Golden, 1978)
Executive function Trail Making Test – Form B (Reitan, 1958)
Stroop Test, word-color interference effect (Golden, 1978)
Controlled Oral Word Association Test, FAS-Test (Loonstra et al., 2001)
Test Barcelona, Animal Words (Peña-Casanova, 1990)
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, WCST-128 (Heaton et al., 1993)
Tower of London Test (Culbertson and Zillmer, 2001)
Working memory Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, Digit Span Test (Wechsler, 2001)
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III, Letter-Number Sequencing Test (Wechsler, 2001)
Verbal memory California Verbal Learning Test, Spanish version –TAVEC (Benedet and Alejandre, 1998)
Visual memory Wechsler Memory Scale-III, Visual reproduction Tests I and II (Wechsler, 1997)
Social cognition Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, MSCEIT (Extremera and Fernández-Berrocal, 2009)
Internal, Personal, and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, IPSAQ (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996)
TABLE 3 | Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample and comparison between groups.
Schizophrenia patients (n = 54) First-degree relatives (n = 43) Healthy controls (n = 44) p-value
Gender, male: n (%) 37 (68.5) 19 (44.2) 21 (47.7) 0.031
Age, years 41.4 (11.1) 50.7 (12.2) 45.6 (12.6) 0.002
Educational level, years 9.7 (2.3) 9.9 (3.5) 10.3 (2.7) 0.502
Employment status: n (%) <0.0001
Employed/Student 5 (9.3) 25 (58.1) 31 (70.5)
Unemployed 12 (22.2) 12 (27.9) 11 (25.0)
Retired 37 (68.5) 6 (14.0) 2 (4.5)
Civil status: n (%) 0.000
Single 39 (72.2) 11 (25.6) 13 (29.5)
Married 10 (18.5) 28 (65.1) 21 (47.7)
Divorced 5 (9.3) 4 (9.3) 7 (15.9)
Widowed 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (6.8)
Handedness, right: (%) 87.0 90.7 90.9 0.378
Estimated IQ 94.70 (11.57) 104.56 (11.51) 105.36 (14.50) 0.000
Values presented as means (standard deviation) unless otherwise specified.
number of counterfactual thoughts than the healthy control
group (p = 0.030). This difference was also observed between
the healthy controls and the schizophrenia patients (p= 0.0001).
However, when adjusted for age, gender, and estimated IQ,
these differences maintained only a borderline level of statistical
difference (F =−0.51, p= 0.061). Nevertheless, and as expected,
patients generated fewer counterfactual thoughts compared with
the other groups (χ2 = 16.15, p=< 0.001). Differences between
controls and patients remained significant even when adjusted
(F =−0.79, p= 0.004).
Counterfactual Inference Test
Analyses of group differences on the CIT total score revealed
statistically significant differences in favor of the relatives
compared with the controls when adjusted for age, gender,
and estimated IQ (F = 0.73, p = 0.005), but not for the
patients compared to the controls (F = 0.19, p = 0.446;
Table 5). When examining each particular scenario of
the test separately, the results revealed that a significantly
higher proportion of first-degree relatives chose the target
counterfactual response than in the other groups for the
specific situations related to regret in the face of an unusual
event (p = 0.047; Scenario 2) and related to judgments of
avoidance also in response to an unusual event (p = 0.036;
Scenario 4). This difference was also observed in Scenario 1
(p = 0.013), but this time in favor of the schizophrenia patients.
No significant differences were found regarding Scenario 3
(Table 6).
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TABLE 4 | The causal order effect (Experiment 1): Descriptive and comparative analysis between groups.
Schizophrenia
patients (n = 54)
First-degree
relatives (n = 43)
Healthy controls
(n = 44)
χ2-test (p-value)
Experiment 1: The causal order effect
Order of the events, n (%) 3.19 (0.922)
1st 13 (24.1) 12 (27.9) 13 (29.5)
2nd 9 (16.7) 7 (16.3) 11 (25.0)
3rd 10 (18.5) 5 (11.6) 6 (13.6)
4th 14 (25.9) 12 (27.9) 9 (20.5)
Reasoning blockinga 8 (14.8) 7 (16.3) 5 (11.4)
1st vs. 2nd, 3rd, 4th, reasoning blocking 24.1/75.9 27.9/72.1 29.5/70.5 0.40 (0.820)
aUnable to choose any event.
FIGURE 1 | Number of counterfactual thoughts generated by groups in the study (Experiment 2).
TABLE 5 | Descriptive and comparative analysis between groups on the
CIT total score.
Schizophrenia
patients
(n = 54)
First-degree
relatives
(n = 43)
Healthy
controls
(n = 44)
Kruskal–
Wallis test
(p-value)
Total score, n (%) χ2 = 5.28
(0.071)
0 7 (13) 4 (9) 6 (14)
1 12 (23) 9 (21) 13 (30)
2 19 (36) 9 (21) 15 (34)
3 10 (19) 13 (30) 8 (18)
4 5 (9) 8 (19) 2 (5)
Associations with CFT Measures
The analyses showed no significant associations between CFT
measures and any of the potential variables considered,
including cognitive performance, schizotypy, and level of PLEs,
in any of the three groups studied. Furthermore, among
schizophrenia patients, clinical variables, including the daily dose
of antipsychotic taken, were not related to CFT performance.
DISCUSSION
Counterfactual thinking is a specific type of conditional
reasoning referring to the individual’s capacity to infer how
an event might have displayed differently without directly
experiencing this alternative scenario (Van Hoeck et al., 2015).
Counterfactual thoughts are pervasive in everyday life and are
involved in other processes such as problem-solving and learning
from the experience (Epstude and Roese, 2008). The study
of potential cognitive endophenotypes for schizophrenia has
significantly increased in recent years in an effort to identify
candidate genes associated with susceptibility for schizophrenia
that could provide a more reliable index of liability than the illness
itself (Gottesman and Shields, 1972; Cannon, 2005). Identifying
these potential cognitive endophenotypes among at-risk samples
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TABLE 6 | Descriptive and comparative analysis between groups on the CIT scenarios.
Schizophrenia
patients (n = 54)
First-degree
relatives (n = 43)
Healthy controls
(n = 44)
Statistic p-value
(1) Upset—spatial nearly happened event, n (%) χ2 = 12.24a 0.014
Target counterfactual response 20 (37.7) 10 (23.3) 9 (20.5)
Non-target response 9 (17.0) 5 (11.6) 1 (2.3)
Same/can’t tell 24 (45.3) 28 (65.1) 34 (77.3)
(2) Regret—unusual event, n (%) χ2 = 9.60 0.048
Target counterfactual response 19 (35.8) 26 (60.5) 21 (47.7)
Non-target response 20 (37.7) 7 (16.3) 8 (18.2)
Same/can’t tell 14 (26.4) 10 (23.3) 15 (34.1)
(3) Rumination—temporal nearly happened event, n (%) χ2 = 2.91 0.573
Target counterfactual response 27 (50.9) 25 (58.1) 25 (56.8)
Non-target response 18 (34.0) 10 (23.3) 9 (20.5)
Same/can’t tell 8 (15.1) 8 (18.6) 10 (22.7)
(4) Judgments of avoidance—unusual event, n (%) χ2 = 12.24 0.036
Target counterfactual response 31 (58.5) 31 (72.1) 20 (45.5)
Non-target response 11 (20.8) 2 (4.7) 7 (15.9)
Same/can’t tell 11 (20.8) 10 (23.3) 17 (38.6)
Comparisons across groups in the study were made using the χ2-test unless otherwise specified. aFisher’s Exact Test.
would not only add knowledge about the pathophysiology of
the disorder, but might also provide new guidelines for early
interventions and prevention programs in schizophrenia patients
and these at-risk individuals (Eack et al., 2010). With this
purpose in mind, and based on previous research findings
that demonstrated a global CFT impairment in schizophrenia
(Hooker et al., 2000; Contreras et al., 2016), the present study
assessed this type of reasoning for the first time in a sample
of non-psychotic first-degree relatives, and compared them with
a group of schizophrenia patients and healthy control subjects.
Several striking results are discussed below in order of relevance.
Compared to what is normally expected in the general
population, first-degree relatives were less skilful at generating
spontaneous alternative representations using CFT in the face
of a fictional situation with a negative outcome (Experiment 2).
This alteration might be related to previous findings of a
broad impairment in executive functions among relatives of
schizophrenia patients, including difficulties in the ability to shift
sets and to generate new alternatives of classification (Szöke
et al., 2005). Moreover, in accordance with the fifth criterion
for endophenotype validation, these preliminary results suggest
deficits in the generation of counterfactual thoughts as a potential
phenotypic marker of schizophrenia (Gottesman and Gould,
2003). Further research using a transdiagnostic approach may
be warranted in order to properly examine the specificity of
these deficits in schizophrenia and the genetic abnormalities
underlying them.
When exploring a higher cognitive level of information
processing, results on the CIT suggest that the first-degree
relatives were in general more adept at deriving inferences
from CFT when compared to the controls. In addition, when
analyzing each item of the test in particular, the relatives were
more proficient at making counterfactual-derived inferences
in the specific scenarios assessing the effect of “unusualness”
of the situation presented. This effect, which has previously
been demonstrated in the general population, describes how
an outcome preceded by an unusual rather than typical action
influences CFT by enhancing it—as assessed in Scenarios 2 and 4
of the CIT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Interestingly though,
our findings suggest that the unusualness of the situation acted as
a more intense CFT trigger for the relatives than for the other
groups in the study. That is, the relatives tended to select the
target-counterfactual response more frequently than the healthy
subjects. Furthermore, a greater reaction of regret and judgments
of avoidance was also observed among relatives compared with
the controls. Again, this effect has also been observed in healthy
controls (Kahneman et al., 1986), but in the present study, it
seemed to be more pronounced among first-degree relatives. One
possible explanation for both findings could rely on the presence
of prominent schizotypy that could predispose these subjects
to reacting more suspiciously than the controls. However, the
present study explored this potential association using the SPQ-
B and the CAPE-42, and no statistically significant results
were found. This might be because the relatives that agreed to
participate were probably the most compliant and most willing to
take part in the research. This may have biased this group, since
presumably relatives with prominent suspiciousness, significant
interpersonal deficits, or subtle thought disorganization may have
been less likely than healthier relatives to collaborate. This might
also explain the lack of differences between relatives and controls
on the SPQ-B and the CAPE-42 scores, along with the fact that
none of the relatives met the criteria for personality disorder.
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Furthermore, results on the CIT might be conceptually linked to
the study of cognitive biases that play a role in the development
and maintenance of delusions in schizophrenia. Specifically, they
might be related to the data gathering bias known as jumping to
conclusions (e.g., inferring that if Sarah had not gone to a new
restaurant she would not have got sick in Scenario 2), which has
been observed not only among schizophrenia patients but also in
their non-psychotic first-degrees relatives (Van Dael et al., 2006;
Broome et al., 2007).
Concerning the causal order effect (Experiment 1), two
results should be highlighted. Firstly, the general pattern of
response when attributing causality under the effect order was
similar between groups, and secondly, all three groups chose
the first event in the sequence as the most decisive one. These
results conflict with previous results on schizophrenia patients
that revealed an alteration in the general pattern of response
(Contreras et al., 2016). Framing their ideas in the mental models
theory, Byrne et al. (2000) suggest that studying the aspects
that people use to construct counterfactual alternatives is highly
relevant, since these aspects, including causality, “give hints about
the ‘joints’ of reality” in human beings (mental models). Thus,
the present findings are more optimistic than previous results,
since they show a preserved capacity among patients to attribute
causality, which has to be beneficial for these patients’ functioning
in daily life.
Finally, none of the cognitive functions assessed was related
to any of the CFT measures recorded, despite the fact that
the neuropsychological test battery was more extensive than
in previous research. Consistent with previous findings in
schizophrenia (Hooker et al., 2000; Contreras et al., 2016), the
present results seem to support Van Hoeck et al.’s (2012) proposal
of an integrated network of systems underlying CFT that might
cut across different psychological domains. If there is not a
distinctive counterfactual reasoning network, it seems logical that
no specific neuropsychological test can detect this impairment.
In fact, as other authors have already suggested, the present
results reinforce the idea that this absence of significance might
actually indicate that CFT could be related to more complex
reasoning, social cognition and ToM-based abilities (Solca et al.,
2015). Studies using other appropriate neuropsychological tests,
as well as neuroimaging techniques, might be useful in solving
this on-going debate.
The results of the present work need to be interpreted within
the context of its limitations. First, as it was a pilot study, it
involved a small number of subjects, which may have resulted
in a lack of statistical power and greater chances of making a
type II error, thus increasing the possibility that the study was
not able to detect actual differences between groups. Second,
there was potential bias in the representativeness of the first-
degree relatives group—those willing to participate were probably
the most “healthy” ones. In addition, there was no comparative
analysis between types of relatives. However, because of the small
sample size, this characteristic was not considered. Moreover,
including parents and siblings all together may have made this
group older on average than the controls and patients, and this
fact might have had an impact on the reported differences. The
authors tried to solve this issue by adjusting the results for age of
the participants along with other possible confounding variables
like gender and estimated IQ.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to report CFT
performance in non-psychotic first-degree relatives of patients
with schizophrenia. Compared with what is normally expected,
relatives presented difficulties when spontaneously generating
counterfactual alternatives to face a problem, and had a
different pattern of reasoning when counterfactually deriving
inferences. These findings represent a step forward in the
investigation of counterfactual reasoning as a potential cognitive
endophenotype for schizophrenia, and provide a new target for
future early interventions and prevention programs not only
for schizophrenia patients but also for these at-risk individuals.
Further carefully designed family studies that incorporate other
psychiatric populations and both molecular and neurobiological
measures are still needed.
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